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Commentary
Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church* Under
Constitutional Scrutiny
1. INTRODUCTION
"Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you
more than unto God, judge ye."' The inevitable conflict2 which
these words create between the demands of one's government and
the dictates of one's conscience has often presented choices of in-
surmountable dimensions to those individuals from whom a choice
is demanded.3 In many cases, the choice simply meant physical
death and eternal happiness or eternal damnation and physical
life.4 Given this choice, many chose death as the better of two bad
alternatives. 5 Even where the choice presented was not as harsh,
many still chose temporary imprisonment or torture and the pros-
pect of eternal blessings over temporal prosperity and anticipated
future chagrin. 6 In any case, the choice often produced an unsatis-
* 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981).
1. Acts 4.19.
2. There can never be an absolute "wall of separation" dividing one's allegiance
to his government from his allegiance to his God so as to eliminate all
conflicts.
The "wall of separation between Church and State" was not and
could not be a Chinese Wall to separate the eternal and the temporal.
The real relationship between Church and State, in America and in
every country where religion is strong, is a thing of the spirit, the
infusion of the spirit of religion into the ordering of the affairs of soci-
ety. A wall of separation which would bar that spirit from making
itself felt in secular concerns can never be built, because it would
have to bisect the human heart.
W. MARELL, THE FiRST AMENDMENT xiii-xiv (1964). As stated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971): "Our prior holdings do not call for total
separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an
absolute sense."
Theoretically, total separation of the conflict could exist only if there were
either no government (anarchy) or no free thought (death).
3. For an accounting of the seriousness of some of the choices, see D. ATrwATER,
MARTYRS (1958); J. Fox, Fox's BOOK OF MARTYRS (W. Forbush ed. 1926). For
more recent examples, see M. BOURDEAU, FArrH ON TRIAL N RussiA (1971).
4. "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: but whosoever will lose his life
for my sake, the same shall save it." Luke 9:24.
5. See D. ATrwATER, supra note 3; M. BOURDEAUX, supra note 3; J. Fox, supra
note 3.
6. As Paul the Apostle stated: "For I reckon that the sufferings of this present
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factory resolution of the problem presented by this inevitable
conflict.
7
Attempts to eliminate the conflict by subordination and com-
pulsion,8 besides being unsuccessful,9 have produced some of the
most barbaric acts in the history of mankind.10 Whether the at-
tempt was to subordinate religion under the state,"] or the state
under a religious system,12 the results have been unpleasant for
those whose consciences dictated that they follow a course differ-
ent from that which the ruling power compelled.'3
In an effort to alleviate those results, our newly formed federal
government, through the first amendment of the Constitution, se-
verely restricted the government's power to compel from its sub-
jects actions or adherence to beliefs which might violate that
which their consciences demanded.'4 Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions' 5 have hopefully sealed into constitutional law the prop-
osition that both government and religion are best served when
time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in
us." Romans 8:18. A logical reasoning supporting the choices some make in
this area can be found. See Pascal, The Wager, in MODES OF ARGUMENT 61 (M.
Beardsley ed. 1967).
7. See D. ATrWATER, supra note 3; M. BouRDEAu, supra note 3; J. Fox, supra
note 3.
8. See H. KAMEN, THE RISE OF ToLERATIoN (1967).
9. "Is uniformity attainable? Millions of innocent men, women, and children,
since the introduction of Christianity have been burnt, tortured, fined, im-
prisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch towards uniformity. What has
been the effect of coercion? To make one half the world fools, and the other
half hypocrites." L PFEFFER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 14 (1979) (quoting Jeffer-
son, Jefferson's Notes on Virginia (1782), in CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 81-82 (J. Blaus ed. 1964)).
10. Most of the examples detailed within the authorities cited in note 3, supra,
resulted from the use of civil power to enforce certain beliefs.
11. Two excellent examples are: (1) the English system set up by Henry VIII in
early 1532 whereby the king became the "'Supreme Head' of the Church in
England," J. MOORMAN, A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND 167 (1973);
and (2) the Soviet system with its constant opposition to religion, J. CURTISS,
THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE SOVIET STATE (1953).
12. The best example is the supremacy of the Roman Church during the Middle
Ages. "In his bull Unan Sanctam in 1302 Boniface VIII claimed that all au-
thority on earth was vested in the Church; two swords ruled the world, but
'both swords, the spiritual and the material, are in the power of the Church."'
H. KAMEN, supra note 8, at 15 (citation omitted).
13. In both cases, widespread persecution often arose. See M. BOURDEAUX, supra
note 3; J. Fox, supra note 3.
14. U.S. CoNsT. amend L The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof ... ." Id. The free exercise clause is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
15. See note 132 infra.
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the number of situations demanding a choice between the two is
most restricted.' 6 Those decisions, in a two-pronged analysis, have
sought to divide state regulation of religious beliefs which are com-
pletely sacrosanct17 from regulation of actions which are protected
under a three-tiered compelling state interest test.18 Under the
compelling state interest test, an infringement of one's religious
beliefs first must be found.19 If such an infringement exists, the
burden falls upon the state to provide a compelling state interest
16. See note 153 & accompanying text infra.
17. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that government reg-
ulation of beliefs is absolutely prohibited. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626
(1978); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
18. Government regulation of actions is permitted to a limited extent. The test
which separates the permissible regulation from the impermissible regula-
tion has been referred to both as a "compelling interest" test, Thomas v. Re-
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and as an "interests of the highest order" test,
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court appears to have
made no cognizable distinction between the two.
The "interests of the highest order" test, as stated in Yoder, mirrors the
compelling state interest test of Thomas and Sherbert. The former test re-
quires that a state interest of "the highest order" and one "not otherwise
served" must be found in order to overbalance a "legitimate" claim to the free
exercise of religion. This test accurately restated the second, third, and first
tiers respectively of the Sherbert free exercise test. Moreover, the Sherbert
case is cited seven times in the Yoder opinion and the notes as support for
the ruling handed down by the Court.
Nevertheless, a minority of lower courts found a distinction between the
two tests by reading Yoder to set forth a more even-handed balancing test
than the test employed in Sherbert. Marshall v. District of Columbia, 392 F.
Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1975), affd per curiam, 559 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Davis
v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974). Some commentators agreed with
these courts in urging a less rigorous test. Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishmen and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967); Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges
on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377 (1974); Note, An Ex-
pansion of the Free Exercise Clause: Wisconsin v. Yoder, 37 ALB. L REv. 329
(1973). Other commentators, however, have stated that the test is and should
be more rigorous. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old
Order Amish: A Commentory on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REv. 423 (1968);
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1969);
Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amend-
ment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213 (1973); Marcus, The Forum of
Conscience: Applying Standards under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 1217; Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. UJ. 1115 (1973).
The Supreme Court apparently settled the controversy by its rejection of
the bifurcation of the Sherbert and Yoder renditions of the test in Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
19. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-16 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215-19 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963).
[Vol. 61:74
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for not allowing an exemption for those whose religion the regula-
tion infringes. 20 Finally, the state must demonstrate that there are
no less restrictive alternatives available to achieve its compelling
state interest.21 Only then will the state regulation be upheld.
Consequently, the heavy burden resting upon the state when it
seeks to justify an infringement of one's religious practices works
to assure Americans that freedom of individual conscience in reli-
gious matters will be preserved.
That assurance, however, has been shaken by the recent Ne-
braska Supreme Court decision in Douglas v. Faith Baptist
Church,22 where the court bypassed an excellent opportunity to
further solidify the "unalienable right"23 of the individual to serve
his God as his conscience demands. The case centered around a
private religious school operated by the Faith Baptist Church of
Louisville, Nebraska. From the school's inception in 1977,24 de-
fendants took the position that "the operation of the school is sim-
ply an extension of the ministry of the church, over which the
State of Nebraska has no authority to approve or accredit."25 As a
result, defendants refused to comply with state education regula-
tions.26 More specifically, they refused to: (1) furnish a list of the
20. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221-22, 236 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963). As the
Court stated in Yoder: "[I] t was incumbent on the State to show with more
particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education
would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish." 406
U.S. at 236.
21. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
22. 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981).
23. James Madison called this right an "unalienable right" in these now famous
words: "The religion, then, of every man, must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as
these may dictate. This right is, in its nature, an unalienable right." A.
SToKEs & L. P EFFE, CHURcH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1964).
24. 207 Neb. at 804, 301 N.W.2d at 573.
25. Id. at 805, 301 N.W.2d at 574.
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-201 (Reissue 1976) requires children between the ages of
7 and 16 "to attend regularly the public, private, denominational, or parochial
day schools each day that such schools are open and in session." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 79-328 (Reissue 1976) gives the State Board of Education the power
and duty to supervise the state school system, id. § 79-328(5); "establish...
procedures for classifying, approving, and accrediting schools," id.; and pub-
lish "laws and regulations governing the schools." Id.
Pursuant to this power, the State Board of Education promulgated a rule
which provided: "Only school systems approved.., by the State Board of
Education are considered to be providing a program of instruction which is in
compliance with the compulsory attendance laws." Nebraska State Depart-
ment of Education, Rule 14 (May 7, 1976). The Rule further specified curricu-
lum requirements and the requirement that a professional staff member
employed by a school must "hold a valid Nebraska certificate ... issued by
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
names and addresses of all students enrolled in the school;27
(2) seek approval of the school's educational program; 28 (3) em-
ploy certified teachers; 29 and (4) seek approval to operate the
school.30 According to the defendants: "Christian education is
mandated by the Bible."31
The State of Nebraska brought suit to enjoin the operation of
the school because of its failure to comply with the state's regula-
tions. The trial court ruled in favor of the state and the Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed. Although there were four issues raised
on appeal,3 2 only the plaintiff's claim that enforcement of the regu-
lations violated their rights as to freedom of religion will be consid-
ered here.3 3 This Commentary will first analyze the constitutional
aspects of government regulation of private religious schools with
particular emphasis on teacher certification requirements. It will
then critique the Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church34 opinion.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TEACHER
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Education, more than any other area in our society, has proved
the State Board of Education." Id. at 12. The certificate could generally only
be obtained by an individual with a baccalaureate degree. Id. at 11. See also
Rule 21.
27. 207 Neb. at 805, 301 N.W.2d at 574. The list is required by NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
207 (Reissue 1976).
28. 207 Neb. at 805, 301 N.W.2d at 574. The State indicated that the school's educa-
tional program would have been approved had approval been sought. Id.
29. 207 Neb. at 805, 301 N.W.2d at 574. See note 26 supra.
30. 207 Neb. at 805, 301 N.W.2d at 574. See note 26 supra.
31. 207 Neb. at 806, 301 N.W.2d at 574.
32. The defendants claim[ed] that the trial court erred in granting the
injunction because: (1) Criminal sanctions are the remedy pre-
scribed by the applicable statutes rather than equitable relief;
(2) The State of Nebraska through the State Department of Educa-
tion has failed to abide by the same statutes and rules that it asks to
be enforced against the defendants; (3) Enforcement of the school
laws violates the defendants' ninth amendment rights to bear, raise,
and educate their children as they see fit; and (4) Enforcement of
the school laws violates the defendants' first amendment rights as to
freedom of religion.
Id. at 803, 301 N.W.2d at 573.
33. This Commentary will not discuss the general parental rights which stem
from the decision of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), except as applica-
ble in the context of the free exercise discussion. Nor will it consider the
differences in the state's required level of proof when the prosecution is for
neglect, truancy, or general failure to comply with compulsory education
laws. Also, the constitutional limits considered in this Commentary in no
way reflect on the proper function of government regulation before state "ap-
proval" is accorded to a school. The limits considered are those which the
state may impose on those who do not wish to achieve state approval.
34. 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981).
[Vol. 61:74
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to be the zone through which the San Andreas fault of church-state
separation has been established. From Minersville School District
v. Gobitis35 to Wisconsin v. Yoder,36 the classic confrontation of
the state's 'paramount responsibility"37 with the individual's "fun-
damental right"38 has shaken the very pillars of judicial integrity.
39
Government regulation of private religious schools has been
the center of the most recent set of tremors and earthquakes in the
nation's educational system.40 Using compulsory education, cur-
riculum, and teacher certification requirements, states have sought
to regulate and control the education given in nonpublic schools
41
over the religious objections of those concerned.42 Therefore, a
careful application of the free exercise test to teacher certification
requirements should not only be helpful in analyzing the Faith
Baptist Church43 case but also in establishing a pattern which may
be used in analyzing other state regulations.
35. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Minersville, the Court upheld, against a free exercise
challenge, the constitutionality of a compulsory flag salute regulation. Mi-
nersville was overruled in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
36. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court, in Yoder, held Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance statute, as applied to an Amish family, an unconstitutional in-
fringement of plaintiff's free exercise of religion.
37. Id. at 213.
38. Id. at 214.
39. In its first religious freedom-education decision, Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court announced an opinion which
was so widely criticized both in and out of legal circles that within three years
the case was explicitly overruled in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See L. PFEFFER, supra note 9, at 128-33. See also
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the decision which took official prayers out
of public schools, which was and continues to be opposed by the overwhelm-
ing majority of Americans. L. PFEFFER, supra note 9, at 80-81.
40. For recent cases in the religious freedom-education area, see Kentucky State
Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351
N.E.2d 750 (1976); Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d
571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D.
1980). For commentaries in this area, see Casad, supra note 18; Forkosch,
Religion, Education, and the Constitution-A Middle Way, 23 Loy. L. REV.
617 (1977); Kurland, supra note 18; Comment, Regulation of Fundamentalist
Christian Schools: Free Exercise of Religion v. The State's Interest in Quality
Education, 67 Ky. L.J. 415 (1979); Note, Freedom of Religion and Compulsory
Education, 26 ARK. L. REV. 555 (1973); Note, Constitutional Lau-Public Reg-
ulation of Private Religious Schools, 37 OHio ST. UJ. 899 (1976).
41. For an example of an extensive state regulatory scheme, see State v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
42. For the distinction between legitimate religious objections and those which
are not legitimate, see notes 44-56 & accompanying text infra.
43. 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981).
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A. Infringement
The first tier of the free exercise test requires that those chal-
lenging the state regulation show that there was a governmental
infringement of their religion.44 Infringement occurs when one is
forced to choose between the demands of his religion and the de-
mands of his government.45 Past compliance with a regulation, al-
though a factor to be considered, should not necessarily induce a
court to find a lack of infringement in later noncompliance.46 The
evils of continuing to require a choice from an individual are the
same whether the person chose to violate the state regulation to
comply with the demands of his religion or whether that person
chose to violate the demands of his religion to comply with the
state regulation. A consistent practice of resisting state regulation,
although bolstering the challenger's argument, is not and should
not be a sine qua non for an infringement.47
On the other hand, a consistent practice of resisting state regu-
lation is not, per se, a showing of infringement.48 The issue which a
court must determine is whether there is a sincerely held religious
belief,49 which conflicts with the demands prescribed in the regula-
44. See note 19 & accompanying text supra. The infringement requirement has
frequently been interpreted to require coercion. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Coer-
cion will be present in the violation of a teacher certification requirement if
the violation leads to the deprivation of an individual's right to life, liberty, or
property. In any case where the possible consequence of disobeying the reg-
ulation is a fine, imprisonment, or the removal of children from the home,
coercion is present.
45. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert Court stated: "The rul-
ing forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental impo-
sition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."
Id. at 404. Accord, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
46. Past compliance may help to show a lack of infringement; however, it may
also show the strength of the coercive effect of the law. That is, a person may
have chosen to violate religious principles rather than face punishment
under the law.
47. To so require would judicially encourage persons to break the law in order to
protect their constitutional rights.
48. People may resist the state's educational regulations for reasons other than
those which would lead to a constitutionally protected infringement. Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215-16 (1972); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc.,
556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Hanson v.
Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Franz, 55 A.D.2d 424, 390
N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977); In re McMillan, 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976).
49. "Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause."
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). The test for determining what
beliefs should be protected was set forth in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
[Vol. 61:74
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tory scheme.50
In the area of state teacher certification requirements, there are
several situations in which a free exercise infringement may arise,
depending upon whose free exercise interests are considered.
51
Under Yoder, if there is a conflict between the parent's religious
beliefs and a state regulation requiring that children be taught by
certified teachers, the infringement tier of the free exercise test
would be satisfied. For example, if a parent objects for religious
reasons to the certification itself or to something a teacher must do
to obtain certification, there would be an infringement. 52 The par-
ent is faced with a choice of whether to obey the government and
violate his religious principles or to obey his conscience and vio-
late the state law.
53
A more difficult problem is presented where there is no in-
fringement of the parent's religious beliefs, but there is a conflict
between the teacher's religious beliefs and the certification re-
quirements. If there is an infringement of the teacher's free exer-
cise of religion,54 potentially creating the right to teach without
certification, there would necessarily have to be a right accorded to
78 (1944), and referred to by the Yoder Court. 406 U.S. 205, 215 n.6 (1972). The
Ballard Court held that although the truth of the individual's belief could not
be questioned, its sincerity could, and, if the belief was sincerely held, it was
protected.
50. For an example of the application of the test under a challenge to a compul-
sory education law, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972).
51. The courts which have addressed teacher certification requirements have
generally considered the parent's free exercise interest, because they were
the ones in violation of the laws by not sending their children to be taught at
schools employing certified teachers. Kentucky State Bd. of Elementary &
Secondary Educ. v. Rudasil, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
938 (1980); Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). In
any particular case, the court should consider the interest of the one before it.
However, if the state proceeds against the school generally, then perhaps ei-
ther or both the interests of parent and teacher would be involved.
52. The role of the parent in the education of the child is firmly entrenched
within our society. The Yoder Court stated: 'This primary role of the par-
ents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition." 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). Thus the right of a
parent to direct his children's education should not be contingent on a partic-
ular form of government approval, e.g., a teaching certificate. This may be
analogized to Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) where the
court struck down a law which conditioned the receipt of welfare benefits
upon the applicant's obtaining a social security number. The plaintiffs ob-
jected to obtaining the numbers because of religious reasons.
53. Coercion will be present in this choice if any sanctions are available for the
state to use against the parent.
54. To satisfy the infringement requirement, a coercive choice is all that is re-
quired. If the result of the requirement would put a noncertified teacher out
of a job, the infringement test should be satisfied.
1982]
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the parents to have their children educated by a noncertified
teacher. Otherwise the teacher would have no pupils to teach
upon exercising his free exercise right. This situation could arise
where the teacher has a direct religious reason for not obtaining
certification, or where the teacher, because of a religious prefer-
ence, chooses to attend a nonapproved higher educational institu-
tion and then after graduation, seeks to teach without meeting the
certification requirements. In the latter situation, an indirect reli-
gious preference rather than a direct religious obstacle would force
the individual to make a choice.-5
Another type of indirect conflict is presented where a parent
who does not object to state certification requirements neverthe-
less places his children with a teacher lacking certification simply
because no teacher possessing a certificate and satisfying the par-
ent's personal religious beliefs was available. In this situation, al-
though the conflict with the state certification requirement is
indirect, it should be sufficient to give rise to an infringement.
5 6
B. Compelling State Interest
When attempting to determine the constitutionality of a state
education regulation which is challenged by an individual on free
exercise grounds, the finding of an infringement only begins the
analytical process. The burden of proof then shifts to the state to
show a compelling state interest in sustaining the regulation as ap-
plied to the particular individual.5 7 Accordingly, in a challenge to
teacher certification requirements, the state must present a com-
pelling reason for not allowing an exemption from the require-
ments of the regulation for this particular individual.58 Since the
55. Whether an infringement would be found in this situation would depend
upon the particular facts involved. If the teacher had only to apply to be cer-
tified, generally no infringement could be shown. On the other hand, if grad-
uation from an approved college were required to obtain certification,
infringement might be shown in the prospective teacher's forced choice of
attending an approved college in order to be certified or forgoing his opportu-
nity to teach and attending the college which he, for religious reasons, wishes
to attend.
56. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968). The Sherbert Court stated: "For
'[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is con-
stitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect.'" Id. at 404 (citation omitted). Accord, Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981). This situation is different than the situation in note 54,
supra, in that here there is no issue involving infringement as to the teacher.
57. See note 20 & accompanying text supra. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-
29 (1972) illustrates the difficulty the state has in sustaining its burden in this
area.
58. The state's burden is always one of showing an interest in not allowing an
[Vol. 61:74
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state's interest in compelling teacher certification stems founda-
tionally from and is limited analytically by the state's interest in
compulsory education,59 an examination of the state's interest in
compelling education is necessary.
60
Under both our democratic political system and our free enter-
prise economic system, education is imperative in order to achieve
the effective and intelligent participation of individuals necessary
to propel the systems.61 Accordingly, the state generally would
exemption. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Protecting the establishment clause principle by
not granting exemptions to general nondiscriminatory legislation is not a
compelling state interest. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); McDan-
iel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Nor is
the state's interest in the overall subject matter under consideration a com-
pelling state interest. If that were true, the Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas
cases would have been decided differently since in each case the state had a
compelling interest in the general subject matter.
59. Except for government standards relating to the health and safety of chil-
dren, most government regulations of private schools stem from the state's
interest in compelling education. Thus the state must have a compelling in-
terest in the underlying education to justify a particular requirement, such as
teacher certification. The state would probably lack the requisite level of in-
terest to require certification of teachers who instruct in subjects not associ-
ated with the state's genuine educational interest. For example, the state
does not and probably could not require all Sunday school teachers, pastors,
priests, nuns, or other religious instructors to obtain a license from the state
before being permitted to teach. Since the state does not have a compelling
interest in religious education, it does not have a compelling interest in certi-
fying teachers to teach religious matters. Moreover, the state, hopefully,
could not require that all parents receive licenses to teach before permitting
them to teach their children. This is because the state's interest in the regu-
lation of education within the family is not sufficient to justify such a
regulation.
60. For a general history of compulsory educational requirements, see Rothbard,
Historical Origins, in THE TWELVE-YEAR SENTENCE 11 (W. Rickenbacker ed.
1974). Court cases since Yoder involving challenges to compulsory education
include: Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Scoma v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. IlM. 1974); Hill v. State, 381 So. 2d
91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); People v. Serna, 71 Cal. App. 3d 229, 139 Cal. Rptr.
426 (1977); Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill,
589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Douglas v. Faith
Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981);
In re Franz, 55 A.D.2d 424,390 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1977); In re R., 79 Misc. 2d 339, 357
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Fam. Ct. 1974); In re McMillan, 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693
(1976); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio
St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976); State v. LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121
(1976); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407, 275 N.W.2d 101 (1978).
61. Decision-making, necessary in a free society, may only be properly made
when adequate knowledge of the available facts is obtained. A lack of knowl-
edge translates directly into bad decisions and consistent bad decisions lead
to one's demise, whether politically or economically. Consequently, unlike a
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
have a compelling interest in preparing its "citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system" 62 and in
preparing "individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient partici-
pants in society."63 The Supreme Court, in recognizing this inter-
est, has correctly stated: "[T] here is no doubt as to the power of a
State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of ba-
sic education." 64 The state has a high "duty to protect children
from ignorance."
65
The state's interest, however, applies only to "basic" educa-
tion 66 and does not include such things as social interaction 67 or
educational equality. 68 Moreover, the state's interest does not ex-
tend into areas of education which are religious in character.
69
Rather the state's compelling interest in education extends only to
those areas necessary to adequately assure effective participation
in society.7
0
What is necessary to assure an individual's effective participa-
society in which one simply does as told, in our society, education for all is of
imperative importance. The Yoder Court, accordingly, stated that the state
has "a high responsibility," "a paramount responsibility," and "a strong inter-
est" in the area of education. 405 U.S. at 213, 236.
62. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 213 (emphasis added). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
66. See note 64 & accompanying text supra. The Yoder Court stated in discuss-
ing a Wisconsin statute requiring school attendance until age 16:
Insofar as the State's claim rests on the view that a brief additional
period of formal education is imperative to enable the Amish to par-
ticipate effectively and intelligently in our democratic process, it
must fall .... When Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for ed-
ucation as a bulwark of a free people against tyranny, there is noth-
ing to indicate he had in mind compulsory education through any
fixed age beyond a basic education.
406 U.S. 205, 225 (1972).
67. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Amish plaintiffs
maintained a very separated existence and yet the Court stated: "Even their
idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the diversity we profess to admire and
encourage." Id. at 226.
68. The Supreme Court has never held or suggested that one must limit his edu-
cation to that which others receive in order to achieve educational equality.
Educational equal opportunities are necessary for state-controlled schools.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But for schools not directly con-
trolled by the state, it is quality and not equality which is the basis of the
state's interest. Quality relates to the concept of a "basic" education which is
the limit of the state's compelling interest. See note 66 supra.
69. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
70. See note 66 supra.
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tion in society may vary according to the type of society in which
the individual lives.71 Thus when the state argues a compelling
state interest in a general compulsory educational scheme, it must
demonstrate a compelling state interest in not allowing an exemp-
tion to that scheme for those who live by guidelines different than
the majority of society.72 Typically, the state's interest in the over-
all scheme will be identical to its interest in having the scheme
applied to a particular individual.73
It is important to note that the state's compelling interest is in
education, not in the regulation of education.7 4 Regulations are the
methods by which the state achieves its compelling state interest.
It is possible for the state's compelling interest in education to be
fulfilled without compliance with the state's regulations governing
education.
75
To effectively protect their legitimate interests in basic educa-
71. As the Yoder Court noted: "It is one thing to say that compulsory education
for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is
the preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live, but
it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the
child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the
Amish faith." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).
72. The compelling state interest must be in not allowing an exemption. See
notes 20 & 58 s-upra.
73. The state's interest in an overall educated society is to insure effective partic-
ipation in our economic and political systems. The state's interest in the edu-
cation of each individual is to insure his or her effective participation in our
economic and political systems. These interests, therefore, often merge.
Nevertheless, where the individual can show that his circumstances are dif-
ferent enough that the two interests do not merge, as the Amish did in Yoder,
it becomes "incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its
admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely af-
fected by granting an exemption." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236
(1972).
74. The distinction between the state's interest and the regulation of that inter-
est often is not made by the courts. See Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207
Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981); State v. Shaver, 294
N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). When the state's interest in regulating education con-
flicts with the free exercise of an individual's religion, the state's interest only
extends to a regulation which both serves the state's compelling interest and
interferes the least with the individual's religion. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
75. Legally, the least drastic alternative aspect of the free exercise test is based
upon the assumption that the state's interest may be met under methods
other than the regulations under consideration. At least three state courts
have expressly found that the education being provided under systems which
did not comply with state regulations was equal or superior to the education
provided in "approved" systems. State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d
252 (Morris County Ct. 1967); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980);
State v. LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). Thus if the approved sys-
tems met the compelling interest of the state in education, the assumption
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tion,76 the states have employed a multiplicity of regulations,77 in-
cluding the requirement that persons who dispense state-
mandated education be certified by the state.78 Such regulations,
however, may prove to be unenforceable when challenged by an
individual who has demonstrated an infringement of his religion.79
Because of the relationship between teacher certification require-
ments and compulsory education,80 the state may only justify de-
nying an exemption from the certification requirements if such a
refusal would promote the legitimate educational interests of the
state.81 Noneducational interests, such as administrative incon-
venience are inadequate to justify denying an exemption.8 2
Therefore, the essence of the entire free exercise evaluation is
that the state must relate each denial of an exemption from state
certification requirements to the educational interests affected di-
rectly by the noncertified teacher.83 If the state is able to show
that the noncertified teacher is unable to or for another reason win
would be that the systems which did not comply with state regulations also
met the compelling interest of the state in educating its citizens.
76. See notes 61-73 & accompanying text supra.
77. For an example, see State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181,351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
78. Four recent cases which addressed the teacher certification issue are Ken-
tucky State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877
(Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church,
207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981); State v. Massa,
95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct. 1967), State v. Shaver, 294
N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
79. This stems from the fact that the state has the burden of proof in this area.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 298 (1963). For an argument in favor of inferring
unenforceability, see Clark, supra note 18, at 345.
80. See note 59 & accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 59-73 & accompanying text supra.
82. Administrative inconvenience has long been deemed an impermissible justi-
fication for invading one's free exercise rights. The regulations in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) were each struck down even
though the exemptions required would cause some administrative problems.
Only if the inconvenience were so great as to render the entire educational
scheme unworkable would it be a sufficient justification. The Sherbert Court,
considering the decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), in relation
to its own set of facts, stated:
Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible,
appeared to present an administrative problem of such magnitude, or
to afford the exempted class so great a competitive advantage, that
such a requirement would have rendered the entire statutory scheme
unworkable. In the present case no such justifications underlie the
determination of the state court that appellant's religion makes her
ineligible to receive benefits.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
83. The state may claim that granting exemptions might lead indirectly to the
decline in the quality of education by the proliferation of spurious claims.
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not dispense the education necessary to meet the state's compel-
ling interest, the state should have sufficient justification for deny-
ing an exemption.84 That is, if the state demonstrates that a
teacher did not understand the subjects being taught sufficiently
to be able to teach others or could not communicate the subjects
effectively to his students, the state would sustain its burden of
proof as to that teacher.8 5 However, the state cannot sustain its
burden of proof simply by showing that the teacher was not certi-
fied;86 the state must show a direct adverse effect on its educa-
However, a similar argument was rejected in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
407 (1963), in the context of unemployment compensation benefits.
84. An argument may be presented that teacher certification laws are invalid per
se when subjected to a free exercise analysis and an infringement is shown
to exist. Essentially, the argument is that although the state has a compelling
interest in education, teacher certification laws simply are not the least dras-
tic alternative means of achieving that compelling interest. If this analysis is
followed, a careful scrutiny of the teaching ability of the teacher involved
would be unnecessary. If this analysis is rejected, a careful scrutiny is
mandatory. See State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980) in which the court
apparently viewed teacher certification laws as less drastic than standardized
tests. But see Kentucky State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980) in which
the court viewed standardized tests as less drastic than teacher certification
requirements under a state constitutional provision.
Chief Justice Krivosha of the Nebraska Supreme Court wrote in dissent-
ing in Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church:
I find nothing either in our statutes or in logic which compels a con-
clusion that one may not teach in a private school without a bacca-
laureate degree if the children are to be properly educated. Under
our holding today, Eric Hoffer could not teach philosophy in a grade
school, public or private, and Thomas Edison could not teach the the-
ories of electricity. While neither of them could teach in the primary
or secondary grades, both of them could teach in college. I have
some difficulty with a law which results in requiring that those who
teach must have a baccalaureate degree, but those who teach those
who teach need not. The logic of it escapes me. The experience of
time has failed to establish that requiring all teachers to earn a bac-
calaureate degree from anywhere results in providing children with a
better education.
207 Neb. 802, 823-24, 301 N.W.2d 571, 582-83 (1981) (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
However, it is unclear whether the Chief Justice simply objected to the bac-
calaureate requirement or whether he objected to the requirement of a
certificate.
85. The burden upon the state is to show a compelling interest in not allowing an
exemption. See notes 20, 58 & accompanying text supra. In this case the state
would have a compelling interest in not allowing the exemption because al-
lowing the exemption would in effect deny the state its constitutional right to
achieve its compelling interest in education. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961).
86. Failure to meet state regulatory requirements does not translate directly into
failure to meet the state's compelling interest in the underlying subject. If
the state's compelling interest in the underlying subject is met, the state has
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tional interests. Consequently, as long as children are receiving an
education equivalent to that received in approved schools, 8 7 the
state lacks a compelling interest in requiring teacher
certification.88
C. Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives
The third tier of the free exercise test would be reached only
after the state has shown that a noncertified teacher failed to dis-
pense to the students that which would satisfy the state's compel-
ling educational interest.89 The state must then show that there
are no less restrictive alternatives available than the teacher certi-
fication requirement to protect its compelling interest in educa-
tion. The state probably would be able to sustain its burden of
proof in this area,90 as long as unnecessary requirements for ob-
taining a certificate were not imposed.9
Consequently, teacher certification requirements under a free
exercise of religion challenge should be sustained only when ei-
ther (1) no legitimate infringement exists 92 or (2) an infringe-
ment exists, but the state has shown that its compelling
educational interests are not being met by the instruction given by
the noncertified teacher and there are no unnecessary require-
ments to obtaining a certificate. 93 In all other situations, the free-
dom of conscience in religious matters should be protected.94
no further interest in enforcing additional regulations. See notes 74-75 & ac-
companying text supra.
87. See note 75 supra.
88. Teacher certification laws should only be valid as they relate to the state's
interest in education. See note 59 supra.
89. See note 21 & accompanying text supra.
90. The state could argue that it can only protect its compelling interest in educa-
tion by preventing a specific teacher from teaching and that the method of
requiring certification is no more restrictive on the teacher's or parent's right
than any other method by which the state could obtain its interest. Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
91. The imposition of unnecessary requirements by definition removes the
teacher certification requirement from the least restrictive alternative
sphere. That removal is fatal for the constitutional survival of the certifica-
tion requirement under a free exercise challenge. However, it is unclear
whether an alternative requirement, such as a standardized test or a degree
from an approved school, would meet the least restrictive alternative test in
court. See note 84 supra.
92. See notes 44-56 & accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 57-91 & accompanying text upra.
94. See notes 1-16 & accompanying text supra.
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III. DOUGLAS V. FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH95 ANALYZED
In resolving the defendants' free exercise challenge to the Ne-
braska education regulations, the Nebraska Supreme Court appar-
ently chose to follow the rationale of one of its previous decisions
9 6
rather than the United States Supreme Court decisions in the
area. The court upheld the closing of the Faith Baptist Church's
school simply because that school had failed to comply with the
state's regulatory scheme.9 7 There was no evidence that the school
was failing to provide a quality education. 98 This was not a case in
which the state's interest in education conflicted with the parents'
free exercise interest in "non-education," 99 but rather one in which
the state's interest in regulating education conflicted with the par-
ents' religious beliefs. By affirming, the court in effect allowed the
state's interest in regulation to override the parents' fundamental
free exercise interest 0 0 in directing the education of their
children.
The court began its first amendment analysis by examining
Meyerkorth v. State,'0 ' a decision it had rendered in 1962 upon a
similar set of facts. In that case, the parents sought to enjoin the
county attorney from bringing suit to close their unapproved
school.102 Relying on Meyer v. Nebraska103 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,0 4 the court held that the state could reasonably regulate
education and that the regulations in question were not unreason-
able; therefore, it denied injunctive relief. 05 Meyer and Pierce, al-
though not compelling the ultimate result in Meyerkorth, did not
explicitly forbid it.106 Thus at the time it was decided, Meyerkorth
may have been legally supportable.
Since the Meyerkorth decision, however, the United States
95. 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981).
96. Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962).
97. The court held that the refusal to comply was "arbitrary and unreasonable."
207 Neb. at 817, 301 N.W.2d at 580.
98. The only evidence set forth in the court's opinion on this point was that the
students "were accomplishing the average amount of progress that most stu-
dents probably were in Nebraska schools." Id. at 807, 301 N.W.2d at 574-75.
99. There was no indication in the opinion that the parents were objecting to
education per se.
100. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
101. 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962).
102. Id.
103. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
104. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
105. 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962).
106. Neither Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923), nor Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), involved the issue of whether reasonable reg-
ulations were constitutionally permissible in the light of a free exercise chal-
lenge, but each seemed to indicate that they might be.
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Supreme Court announced two important decisions relating to the
free exercise clause. In 1963, the Court very clearly set forth a
three-tiered compelling state interest test in Sherbert v. Verner.
0 7
Nine years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder,O8 the Court applied the
Sherbert test to a compulsory education requirement challenged
by Amish parents. By the time the Faith Baptist Church case was
presented to the Nebraska court, the reasonable regulation test, if
ever the proper test, had been outdated for eighteen years and the
compelling state interest test had become the law of the land. 0 9
Although the Sherbert case has been cited approvingly in three
United States Supreme Court free exercise cases decided after
it,11o the Nebraska Supreme Court majority did not even mention
the decision in its opinion in Faith Baptist Church. Instead, it in-
terpreted Yoder as only giving lip service to the compelling inter-
est test"' and then in turn, presented its verbal dues to the
compelling interest test and apparently applied the same standard
applied earlier in Meyerkorth." 2 The "arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconstitutional"" 3 language of the Meyerkorth decision subse-
quently became the "legitimate, reasonable, and compelling""
4
language of the Faith Baptist Church decision. This effectively al-
lowed the court to give judicial blessing to the state's action in
seeking the closure of a religious educational institution. In order
to reach this result, the court relied heavily upon certain language
from the Yoder opinion.
Initially, the court stated: "[T] he Yoder court did recognize the
principle upon which our decision in Meyerkorth was based.
'There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high respon-
sibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regula-
tions for the control and duration of basic education.' "115 Standing
alone, the latter statement could lend support to the Meyerkorth
result that reasonable regulations may override free exercise
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
108. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
109. For a summary of the applicable standard under the free exercise clause, see
Marcus, supra note 18.
110. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Sherbert is mentioned 13 times
with approval in the majority opinion); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
(Sherbert is cited once with approval in the plurality opinion, twice in the
concurrence of Justice Brennan); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(Sherbert is cited seven times with approval in the majority opinion).
111. See note 122 & accompanying text infra.
112. See note 144 & accompanying text infra.
113. Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 904, 115 N.W.2d 585, 593 (1962).
114. 207 Neb. at 817, 301 N.W.2d at 580.
115. Id. at 811, 301 N.W.2d at 577 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972)).
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claims in the area of education. However, as quoted by the Ne-
braska court, the Yoder opinion continued:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond
the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the
practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its require-
ment, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override
the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
116
When considered together, these two passages from Yoder reveal
that the state generally may "impose reasonable regulations for
the control and duration of basic education,""17 but those regula-
tions will become constitutionally suspect if a free exercise claim
is raised.118 This interpretation is further supported by several
later portions of the Yoder opinion. First, the Court stated: "A
way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be inter-
posed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious be-
lief."119 This language compels the conclusion that the free exer-
cise clause may be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state
regulation. In another passage the Yoder Court stated:
We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest in its
system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the estab-
lished religious practices of the Amish must give way. Where fundamen-
tal claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot accept
such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity in the generality of
cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to
promote by its requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the
claimed Amish exemption.
120
Significantly, the Court cited Sherbert as the source for the above
test. A final statement by the Yoder Court conclusively estab-
lishes that the proper test is not the "reasonable regulation" test
employed in Meyerkorth:
However read, the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the
rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. And,
when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim
of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a "reasonable re-
lation to some purpose within the competency of the State" is required to
sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First
Amendment.
12 1
116. Id. at 811-12, 301 N.W.2d at 577 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972)).
117. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
118. Id. at 213-14, 233.
119. Id. at 215.
120. Id. at 221.
121. Id. at 233.
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Since something higher than a mere reasonable relationship is
needed to sustain a regulation challenged under the free exercise
clause, the Meyerkorth decision is without precedential value be-
cause it was based upon the wrong test. However, the Nebraska
court, in Faith Baptist Church, characterized Yoder as follows:
The majority opinion in Yoder, then, although employing a "compelling
interest" rule, nevertheless was greatly, if not completely, influenced by
the process of balancing .... It is somewhat difficult to develop a genera-
lized rule from the court's specific holding. The concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice White, with whom, however, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Stewart joined, is more illuminating of the rule in its general
application.
12 2
Unless the Nebraska court was referring to a balancing test heavily
weighted in favor of the individuals' free exercise rights, its analy-
sis of Yoder is incorrect. There was nothing in the Yoder opinion
which suggested that the Court did not apply the weighted balanc-
ing test required under Sherbert. 23 In fact, it would have been
somewhat incongruous had the Court not applied the weighted
balancing test since it stated early in the opinion: "The essence of
all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 124
Further, language in Yoder suggests the Court employed the
weighted test:
It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond
the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the
child for life in modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another
if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child for life in
the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish
fath.125
The Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted this language to support
the application of an even-handed balancing test. However, the
language suggests quite strongly that the state's interest in free
exercise cases must equate to the "necessary" level, and that any
lesser level of interest simply is not strong enough to justify an
infringement of one's free exercise rights.126
Additionally, the Nebraska court's reliance upon the concurring
opinion of Justice White as the correct statement of the test 127 em-
ployed in Yoder was misplaced. The Yoder majority and Justice
122. 207 Neb. at 813, 301 N.W.2d at 578.
123. For a summary of the test set forth in Yoder and its relation to the Sherbert
test, see note 18 supra.
124. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
125. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
126. This interpretation is in accord with the Sherbert analysis. Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
127. 207 Neb. at 813, 301 N.W.2d at 578.
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White did not apply the same test; therefore, Justice White's state-
ment of the test was not an accurate reflection of the appropriate
test.128 The test applied by the majority was a weighted balancing
test with the weight heavily in favor of the individual.129 In con-
trast, Justice White apparently applied a nonweighted balancing
test.130 Much as the Nebraska court may have been attracted to
Justice White's test, its duty lay in applying the test of the
majority.
A third objection to the Nebraska court's analysis of Yoder
stems from its statement: "It is somewhat difficult to develop a
generalized rule from the court's specific holding."131 The court
apparently was attempting to interpret Yoder independently of
Sherbert instead of reading the two decisions in pari materia. The
generalized rule sought by the Nebraska court has been in the pro-
cess of being synthesized since the Reynolds v. United States1
32
128. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that both the majority and concur-
ring opinions employed the same test, there still would be no certainty that
both framed the tests in the same words, and a shift in words may change the
outcome of the test in particular circumstances.
129. See notes 123-26 & accompanying text supra.
130. Justice White stated:
Cases such as this one inevitably call for a delicate balancing of
important but conflicting interests. I join the opinion and judgment
of the Court because I cannot say that the State's interest in requir-
ing two more years of compulsory education in the ninth and tenth
grades outweighs the importance of the concededly sincere Amish
religious practice to the survival of that sect.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 237-38 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
131. 207 Neb. at 813, 301 N.W.2d at 578.
132. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the Court stated that religious actions could
be governed but did not lay down an even-balanced test to determine when
they could be governed. A test was suggested in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (emphasis added), in which the Court stated: "In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permis-
sible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Even at this early time,
the balance appeared to be tilted in favor of the "protected freedom." While
the test applied in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), may
have approximated Justice White's test, that type of analysis was rejected in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and the express holding of
Gobitis was overruled in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). The Murdock Court stated:
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial.
The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted.
A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity be-
cause it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment
along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and
treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the
ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion
are in a preferred position.
319 U.S. at 115. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (emphasis
added), the Court stated "[T ]he state has a wide range of power for limiting
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decision in 1878. Nowhere in that process has the test in Justice
White's concurrence been employed in free exercise cases.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's reliance on Application of
Urie133 as support for its holding134 further demonstrates the
court's failure to place the free exercise rights of the petitioners in
a 'preferred position." 135 In that case, a plaintiff who had gradu-
ated from an unaccredited law school in California applied for ad-
mission to the Alaska bar.13 6 The Alaska court, in upholding the
rejection of plaintiff's application, explained the test employed in
reaching its decision as follows:
Since Alaska's equal protection analysis is more demanding than the fed-
eral "rational basis" test, there is, afortiori, no violation of federal equal
protection guarantees. We need not consider whether the Alaska bar rule
meets the more demanding federal requirement of a "compelling state in-
terest" because that standard is only applicable if the complainant is a
member of a suspect class or the procedure at issue violates a fundamen-
tal right. Neither is the case here.
1 3 7
In relying on the Urie decision to directly support its holding in
Faith Baptist Church, the Nebraska court more clearly revealed
that it was not applying a compelling state interest test but rather
an even-handed balancing test.138 The test employed in Urie was
an inappropriate one to use in resolving the Faith Baptist Church
issues because Urie did not involve a fundamental right.139
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and
... this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious convic-
tion." Again, religious freedom was placed in an exalted position in relation
to other interests. Moreover, that Court strictly confined the Prince holding
to the facts before it. Id. at 171. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-
30 (1972).
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961), although sustaining the state
regulation, placed the "least restrictive alternative" burden on the state. Fol-
lowing Braunfeld was Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which was cited
as the authority for the proper test in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981). Although the Sherbert Court first stated the full test, the Thomas
Court most succinctly stated the test as follows: "'The state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest." 450 U.S. at 718.
133. 617 P.2d 505 (Alaska 1980).
134. 207 Neb. at 816, 301 N.W.2d at 579.
135. "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred
position." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
136. 617 P.2d at 506.
137. Id. at 509 n.7 (citations omitted).
138. Since the Urie court did not engage in a compelling state interest analysis, its
decision could not be applied to a case involving a fundamental right without
first making that important distinction. If the Nebraska court made the dis-
tinction, it was with the mind and not the pen.
139. The rationale of a case involving a challenge to teacher certification require-
ments, Kentucky State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589
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The court, in the last two paragraphs of its opinion, did attempt
to pay some respect to the compelling interest standard, but with-
out much enthusiasm or success. 140 First, the court stated:
However, we think it cannot fairly be disputed that the requirement of a
baccalaureate degree for teacher certification is neither arbitrary nor un-
reasonable; additionally, we believe it is also a reliable indicator of the
probability of success in that particular field. We believe that it goes with-
out saying that the State has a compelling interest in the quality and abil-
ity of those who are to teach its young people. 14 1
Although this appears to be an accurate statement, its relevance to
the test employed by Sherbert and Yoder is unclear. Both Sherbert
and Yoder require the compelling state interest to be in not al-
lowing an exemption rather than simply in the subject matter of
the regulation.142 The fact that a regulation is neither "arbitrary
nor unreasonable" is not determinative in a free exercise case.143
The last statement made by the Nebraska court concerning the
existence of a compelling state interest was as follows: "The re-
fusal of the defendants to comply with the compulsory education
laws of the State of Nebraska as applied in this case is an arbitrary
and unreasonable attempt to thwart the legitimate, reasonable,
and compelling interests of the State in carrying out its educa-
tional obligations, under a claim of religious freedom."' 44 Again,
the court failed to appreciate that the compelling state interest
must be in denying the exemption to those particular defend-
ants,145 and that the state's general interest in carrying out its edu-
cational obligations is not enough to sustain its burden.146 Further,
even if the state sustained its burden of proof, it would still have an
obligation to prove that there were no less drastic alternatives
available.147 The Nebraska Supreme Court did not even mention
this consideration in its decision.
S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980) (decided on state con-
stitutional provision), was rejected by the Nebraska court in favor of Urie.
207 Neb. at 816, 301 N.W.2d at 579. In so doing, the court failed to recognize an
important distinction between the two cases. Rudasill involved a fundamen-
tal right, whereas Urie did not The difference in the two opinions could be
directly accounted for by the degree of scrutiny employed in the tests in each.
140. 207 Neb. at 816-17, 301 N.W.2d at 579-80.
141. Id. at 816-17, 301 N.W.2d at 579.
142. See notes 20, 58 & accompanying text supra.
143. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
144. 207 Neb. at 817, 301 N.W.2d at 580.
145. See notes 20, 58 & accompanying text supra.
146. This was precisely one of the issues decided in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
147. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The free exercise test, as synthesized by the United States
Supreme Court, has granted to individuals an absolute right to be-
lieve as their consciences dictate and a significant right to practice
those beliefs without unnecessary governmental interference. In
the area of education, however, this right has been somewhat re-
stricted by unnecessary government regulation. To properly pro-
tect the rights of individuals to follow their consciences in religious
matters, adherence to the free exercise test as laid down by the
Supreme Court is in order. The practical result of that test does
not unduly hinder the state from protecting its legitimate interests
in education. That result may be stated as follows: When parents,
because of religious reasons, object to public school education,
they may opt to send their children to a private school.148 If there
is no private school within a reasonable distance which is both
state-approved and not violative of the parents' religious beliefs,
the parents should have the option of providing an "equivalent"
education. In any contested case, the burden is on the state to
show that its educational interests are not being met. Only then
should the state be able to sustain teacher certification require-
ments in the face of a free exercise challenge.
The recent case of Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church49 even if
correct in its ultimate decision,150 constitutes a severe blow to reli-
gious freedom in Nebraska and is contrary to the free exercise test
which has evolved through United States Supreme Court deci-
sions. The decision will unnecessarily place individuals in a posi-
tion where they must make a choice between their God and their
government;15' it will not be "unreasonable" for those individuals
to choose to obey their God and suffer punishment at the hands of
the government.152 The effect of the Supreme Court's compelling
interest rule is to limit those situations as much as is practically
possible. But when state courts fail to follow that rule, the circum-
148. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
149. 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981).
150. If the facts failed to establish an infringement or, alternatively, if the facts
established an infringement but further established that the education re-
ceived in the church-operated school was below the level of education neces-
sary to insure the continued viability of our society, both politically and
economically, and additionally that the state's method of regulating educa-
tion in this area was the least drastic alternative, then the court's ultimate
decision in the case would be correct.
151. The evil to be avoided, if possible, is a compelled choice. Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
152. See notes 5-7 & accompanying text supra.
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stances in which a choice is demanded increase to the detriment of
both the individuals involved and society in general.1
53
Timothy J. Binder '81
153. The effect on society of increasing the number of coercive choices required is
the encouragement of civil unrest and the antagonism of certain groups
within society. The effect on individuals is increased mental pressure as well
as the loss of liberty or property in certain situations. Neither result is
desirable.
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